Random Metaphysical Questions

 A Metaphysical Question Game 

1.      Does god exist or does He exist as a concept in our minds?

2.      Who is God that we think of?

3.      Is he a He or a She?

4.      How can we be certain about it?

5.      Is a divine being applicable to gender classification?

6.      How can we describe God?

7.      If we cannot know who God is, can we know that He exists or not?

8.      If God is an intangible being, how can we prove His existence?

9.      If God’s existence is an unquestionable fact, why do we always have doubts regarding his existence?

10.  If He is the Creator of all, why did He create me in a way that allows these doubtful thoughts about his existence?

11.  Is He testing me this way?

12.  Is He intending to enable my doubts regarding His existence lead me to believe in him more?

13.   Is doubt the first step towards certainty?

14.  If doubt is the source of certainty, what is the source of doubt?

15.  How can we doubt the existence of a being that we did not acknowledge or see in the first place?

16.   Is it possible not to doubt God’s existence, considering the fact that we have never seen Him?

17.  Is it fair to believe in the existence of a being that we have never captured its whole existence?

18.  Is it fair that God can see us and we cannot see Him?

19.  How can we know that God is watching us?

20.  Is He watching us all the time?

21.  Is He keeping a track of all of us at the same time?

22.   Is He watching us to control us or to judge us?

23.  If He wants to control us, why did He give us the power of choice in doing things?

24.  If He wants to judge us and place us in different moral positions, why did He give us the ability to commit sins?

25.  Is He testing our ability to overcome our temptations and desires?

26.  Is He trying to see if virtue will win evil?

27.  Is He testing the influence of the concept of reward and punishment in human’s behavior?

28.  Is life a big experimental lap?

29.   Will knowing the purpose of our lives make us less doubtful?

30.  Does blind faith make us any happier?

31.  Does knowledge lead to more questions and more doubts accordingly?

32.  Is knowledge a curse or a blessing?

33.  Are high-educated people happier than common people are?

34.  Does high education level help people in figuring out the truth of God?

35.  Did believers in God have any doubts or questions regarding his existence?

36.  Is faith or doubt part of our mere human nature?

37.  How do peasants and wanderers get to believe in the existence of God?

38.  Do we believe in God by nature or by habit?

39.  If we had been rasid by nature with no education, would that be better for us?

40.  Is education what creates conflicts in our beliefs and ideas?

41.  Is our education and upbringing what formulates our ideas and beliefs?

42.  What makes us who we are?

43.  What makes us different from others?

44.  Why do people have different personalities?

45.  Is it because people think in very different ways?

46.  If we were made to think in the same way, would that avoid clashes among people?

47.  Do people have arguments because they view things from different perspectives?

48.  What makes us view life from a specific perspective?

49.  To what extent being from a specific place makes us view things from a specific perspective?

50.  Is being from a specific place on earth makes us who we are?

51.  What makes us unique then?

52.  Is it our souls?

53.  Is it our bodies?

54.  Is it our minds?

55.  Is it our memories?

56.  How can we be certain that we have a unique quality that makes us different from each other?

57.  If we do have that unique quality, why cannot we figure it out?

58.  If we cannot figure it out, why do not we give it up?

59.  Do we hate to feel overcome and powerless?

60.  Do we want to prove to ourselves that our capacities are unlimited?

61.  Is that why we keep thinking all the time?

62.  Can we really stop thinking?

63.  Are we going to be dead if we stopped thinking?

64.  Can we have absolute control over our thoughts?

65.  Do some extraordinary people have the ability to control their thoughts?

66.  Does that control over their thoughts make them suffer less?

67.  Can those people overcome the influence of the bad memories from their childhood?

68.  Why do bad memories insist on us more than good memories?

69.  What would happen if our minds were not made to keep memories?

70.  Would we live happier?

71.  Do people have one common thought?

72.  Do all people have one common fear?

73.  Do we fear our pasts or our futures more?

74.  Do we fear others or ourselves more?

75.  Do we fear others for who they are or for how they might act towards us?

76.  Do we fear ourselves when we cannot accept ourselves and tolerate our flaws?

77.  Do we fear ourselves because we worry that others might reject us?

78.  Do we fear being ourselves because we are not comfortable with whom we are?

79.  Do we fear being ourselves because we are not sure who we are?

80.  Can we be ourselves when we do not know who we are?

81.  How can we know that we exist if we do not know who we are?

82.  How can we know that anything exists when we doubt our own existence?

Concerning Memory Theory of Personal Identity: Examining Real Memories vs. Apparent Memories

March 4th, 2010

Concerning Memory Theory of Personal Identity: Examining Real Memories vs. Apparent Memories 

What makes me? A question that dazzled philosophers and had never led them to consensus. John Perry in his Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality displayed four theories of personal identity; body theory, soul theory, memory theory and brain theory, each of which has its advantages and its problems. In this paper, I will discuss the memory theory, which I find the most plausible. I will display some advantages of the theory and some arguments against it. Finally, I will defend my theory and respond to some of the objections on it.

According to the memory theory, having sameness and continuity of memory over time is what makes one the same person. Bodily identity, sameness of soul and sameness of brain are not necessary for personal identity (Perry 42) . Person A is identical to person B only if they have the same chains of memory over time even if they happen to have different bodies, different souls or different brains. The theory is supported by the concept of ‘‘person-stages’’, which views a person as consisted of different ‘stretches’ of conscious experiences (Perry 25).What makes two person stages belong to the same person is the ability of the later person stages to remember the earlier person stages because of their connection over time through a chain of memory. The memory theory suggests the concept of ‘real memory’ as ‘apparent memory, caused in the right way’ (Perry 45).

Assuming the validity of the memory theory, we can see the advantages of that theory especially regarding the belief of human immortality. If one can be the person he was before his death in case he had the same memories, it follows that one can survive his bodily death and be the same person without requiring sameness of body. In fact, we do not need to examine our bodies to judge that we have the same memories we had in the past and will have in the future. Thus, our memories are not dependent on our bodies. Accordingly, the memory theory liberates personal identity of any dependence on bodily identity. As a result, it becomes easier for one to judge his own identity without needing to examine his body (Perry 44) . If one can remember what happened to him yesterday, and will be able to remember tomorrow what happened to him today, it makes him the same person. Moreover, the memory theory focuses on the psychological or the mental proprieties of people and considers those properties the ‘mark of their individuality’ among others (Perry 43). Therefore, those properties should be the crucial thing in determining what preserves one’s personal identity (Perry 44).

A problem that the memory theory faces in regards of judging sameness or continuity of memory that there is no way to prove it except through introspection. We cannot conclude Sameness of memory from sameness of psychological characteristics, because ‘Similarity, however exact, is not identity’ (Perry 6). When person A has similar psychological characteristics with person B (honesty, kindness, patience, rudeness, rebellion, etc.) it does not mean that person A can be person B. Thus, we cannot conclude sameness of self from sameness of memory until we find a way to prove sameness of memory.

Furthermore, the memory theory faces the same problem that the soul theory faces which is accessibility. Because we cannot access others’ memories and others cannot access ours’, it makes it impossible to examine the occurrence or the continuity of them over time. The very immaterial nature of memory; untouchable, unseen, unmeasured and unfelt makes it impossible to neither observe any possible change in it nor make any judgment about it. Thus, we cannot judge if we are experiencing real memories or only apparent ones. The inability or difficulty of distinguishing between real and apparent memories is the most controversial problem with the memory theory. To solve this problem, Perry suggests that real memory is memory that we can refer to its actual cause in the time we recall it. For example, when someone remembers having an accident and remembers himself not paying attention to the road before the occurrence of the accident, it makes it a real memory. Whereas when one remembers people telling him that he had an accident and he only can remember what people told him about what happened before or during the accident , this makes it a an apparent memory.

The problem with this kind of distinction that we do not have a way to make sure that we only seem to remember while we think that we are truly remembering. The human mind always finds ways to prove that its memory is simultaneously produced due to actual causality. For example, a 3 years old boy is told the story of his cousin beating him up. The boy, because of repeatedly hearing the story, remembers how his cousin did beat him and how painful it was, and makes up details that prove that he is actually remembering the incident not seeming to remember it. The memory of being beaten up is a real memory from the boy’s point of view because he believes he remembers its causality. The same memory is an apparent memory from the point of view of witnesses who saw the incident going on in a different way from the way the boy describes it. Accordingly, one specific memory can be both real and apparent from different perspectives according to that distinction.

Another source of difficulty for the memory theory faces is its criterion of distinguishing between real memory and apparent memory, which is causality. If causality requires making a judgment about the existence or the occurrence of something in the external world, it will be difficult to determine if our perception of its identity is what actually it is. Therefore, causality is not a reliable criterion for preserving the distinction between real memory and apparent memory unless we judge it from God’s perspective. A Relativist would argue that even God, as the ultimate objective eye that captures the real identity of the whole universe, could not alter our perception of incidents in the physical world because even if we had access to his objective judgment, His judgment itself would be a subject of our perception. Since people do perceive the same thing differently, it follows that nothing in the external world has a meaning or real identity in itself. In other words, nothing inherently means anything in itself. Our minds are designed to automatically add meanings and make up interpretations to incidents in the external world and consequently create its identity. In that sense, memory itself is a human production.

Considering the fact that we create our memories without actually referring to the incidents that cause them, our memories are neither apparent nor real. Most of our memories are formed by our emotions (e.g. sorrow, joy, hate, love, reverence, etc.) and strongly connected to them. When someone remembers or seems to remember an incident, he cannot separate that incident from the emotion was caused neither by it nor from the interpretation that he makes up about it. That makes one’s memories always real from his own point of view because according to him, he cannot seem to remember something that is closely related to his emotions. The remembrance of a memory is in itself a sufficient proof to one’s belief in the real existence of that memory. Humans do not refer to the external world regarding their interpretations and memories of it even if they pretend doing so. This assumption can help the memory theory because it does not make the theory require distinguishing between real memories and apparent memories. Moreover, in cases of ‘‘body transplant’’ the possibility of being deluded regarding one’s memories will not occur because what makes a deluded person deluded is the fact that he cannot know it (Perry 38) . Perhaps some think that Mary Frances Beaudine is the one who survived ‘deluded, thinking she was someone else’, Julia (Perry 40). However, since Mary cannot know that she is deluded in remembering being Julia (i.e. does have a real memory), this will make her the same person according to the memory theory, even if she has a different body or a different mind. The only case where the memory theory will fail in such a situation is if Mary somehow becomes aware of the fact that she is deluded in remembering being Julia.


Works Cited

Perry, John. A Dialogue On Personal Identity and Immortality . Indianapolis,Indiana : Hackett Publishing Company, 1978.