Is Harry Frankfurt’s ‘’On Bullshit’’ An Embodiment of Bullshit?

Is Harry Frankfurt’s ‘’On Bullshit’’ An Embodiment of Bullshit?


‘’ On Bullshit ‘’ a book written by Harry G. Frankfurt and published by Princeton University Press is meant to clarify a concept that Frankfurt describes in one of his interviews as ’widely used but poorly understood’ which is: bullshit. Frankfurt claims to devote his book to explore the concept of bullshit and to answer his question: ‘’why there is so much of it and what functions it serves’’ (Frankfurt 1). Since Frankfurt doubts that ‘’ most people are rather confident of their ability to recognize bullshit and to avoid being taken in by it’’, he offers to provide a ‘’ theoretical understanding ‘’ of bullshit (1-2).

Frankfurt’s main claim throughout the book is that the essence of bullshit is ‘’ the indifference to how things really are’’ (34) Frankfurt displays different entries of the word bullshit in the Oxford English Dictionary and analyses them without referring to any philosophical approach in doing so. (3) He uses Max Black’s The Prevalence of Humbug to explore the concept of bullshit although he claims to be ‘’ uncertain just how close in meaning the word humbug is to the word bullshit’’ (4). Nevertheless, he thinks that Black’s definition of humbug (deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes) has some characteristics of the concept of bullshit. (6) Surprisingly, he goes on to analyze the different components of that definition to find out characteristics of the concept bullshit by using humbug as if it is an equivalent of bullshit! (9) He builds his claim on the argument that both bullshit and humbug are ‘short of lying’ and that people who commit it ‘’ misrepresent themselves in a certain way.’’ (19) However, he sums up the difference between the two concepts and claims that humbug is a gentler expression than bullshit. (5)

The concept of lying is an essential element of Frankfurt’s whole argument and he uses it to juxtapose it with the concept of bullshit. He devotes a big proportion of his book to compare lying and bullshitting since he declares at the beginning of the book that he wants to show ‘’what bullshit is and how it differs from what is not.’’ (2) He claims that although both concepts include ‘’the intention to deceive’’, yet lying is ‘’deliberate misrepresentation’’ while bullshitting is not. (7-8) He argues that a liar tries to conceal the truth for a reason or another whereas a bullshitter only cares to accomplish his personal purpose. Frankfurt also compares lying and bluffing and he claims that ‘’ lying is about falsity and bluffing is about fakery’’ (47). According to this comparison, he claims that bullshitting is more like bluffing because ‘’ the essence of bullshit is not that it is false but that is phony ‘’ (47).

Since Frankfurt does not attempt to present a ‘survey of the literature’ of bullshit, he justifies that by saying: ‘’ because I do not know how to go about it.’’.(3) It is absolutely a courageous remark of him to admit this fact especially that he claims earlier that he is not considering’ the rhetorical and misuses of bullshit’’ (2)! Since Frankfurt explores the rhetorical aspect of bullshit more than any other thing, this raises a question of why he would want to give a philosophical analysis of a concept when he does not know ‘’how to go about it’’! (4) Furthermore, while exploring the word bullshit, he presents some entries of uses of the word bull, despite the fact that both words are differently used, assuming that bull sessions are bullshit sessions! (38)

Although Frankfurt argues that, most significant questions about the concept of bullshit are unasked yet, he does not refer to most of those questions through the course of the book. (3) For instance, he questions our attitude toward bullshit and why it is ‘’generally more benign than our attitude toward lying ‘’ (50) but he refers the question to his readers to explore its answer without suggesting any hints that can help them to do so! However, Frankfurt states some significant questions with regards of bullshit and its function, but he never comes to fulfill his mission in answering them thoroughly. He asks ‘’ Is the bullshitter by his very nature a mindless slob? Is his product necessarily messy or unrefined?’’(21) He does not answer these questions crucially and rather suggests that the bullshitter does not pay attention to details and his work is not carefully ‘’wrought’’ which contradicts with his earlier claim that the bullshitter only cares to accomplish the purpose of his misrepresentation(21-22). Because if the bullshitter wants his audience to get a specific impression of what he is saying, then he needs to be careful while trying to communicate that. That means that the mindlessness characteristic Frankfurt talks about is part of the bullshitter’s pretentious job because he wants people to think that he is mindless so he pretends to be so.

One of the deficiencies of Frankfurt’s book is its lack of practical examples of bullshit. Frankfurt mentions that political life specifically is full of such instances but he never mentioned one! (22-23) Frankfurt mentions the example of Wittgenstein’s friend; Fania Pascal, and argues that Pascal’s statement ‘’ I feel just like a dog that has been run over’’ (24) is an instance of bullshit. He spends too much time in proving that Pascal was indifferent to the truth without considering some significant problematic questions regarding that specific situation. Since Pascal was sick, it is possible to argue that she was not necessarily in a stable mental and emotional state to take her statement too much seriously. It is obvious that she did not know what it feels like to be ‘’ a dog that has been run over’’ and it is illogical that she thought that Wittgenstein would take it but metaphorically. It is possible that she wanted to communicate the idea that she felt horrible to an extent that he could not envision what she was feeling, as the impossibility of feeling what a run over dog feels. Therefore, the idea of this indescribable situation, specifically pain in her case, might have been the fact she wanted to communicate more than what Frankfurt thought to be the fact.

Frankfurt talks more clearly about bullshit by the last quarter of the book. He insists on the idea that a bullshitter does not try to conceal the truth because he simply does not care about it. He claims that although a bullshitter is more free in misrepresenting ‘’his enterprise’’, yet his job is not necessarily easier than that of a lair (54-55). The job of a bullshitter as Frankfurt describes it is ‘’ more expansive and independent, with more spacious opportunities for improvisation, color, and imaginative play.’’(53) Thus, he considers bullshitting to be a matter of ‘art’ (53) which implies Frankfurt’s personal appreciation of bullshit, because you do not consider something a kind of art unless you appreciate it in some way!

The connection Frankfurt makes between democracy or democratic societies and the increase of bullshit is quite interesting. (64) He argues that in those societies citizens are expected to express their opinions about almost everything which makes them say things that are unconnected to their ‘’apprehension of reality’ (64-65)’. He suggests that most people in those societies are compelled to talk about things they are ignorant of or do not know much about, which increases the likelihood of the occurrence of bullshit. People in politically repressed societies tend to be less expressive because of the submissive behavior their societies require. In other words, they are more recipients than being interactive (like in democratic societies).This argument is logical but the question here is; do undemocratic societies have less bullshit than democratic societies? If yes, then is there any statistics that prove this very fact and how can we benefit from it?

Honestly, I cannot see how the connection of Frankfurt’s argument and Saint Augustine’s view of lying and lairs serves to distinguish lying from bullshit as Frankfurt claims. However, I still like Augustine’s concept of lying and its psychological analytical approach (56). Saint Augustine analyzes human actions according to their motives and denies calling a person ‘liar’ because he divorces the action from the actor in the sense that not anyone who lies is a liar. He states that a lie that has another intention rather than deception is not a real lie, yet’’ the lie which told solely for the pleasure of lying and deceiving, that is, the real lie.’’(57-58) Augustine’s philosophy encourages tolerance and inspires understanding to human needs and fears, which can be very helpful in solving many social and psychological problems.

I find the final claim that Frankfurt makes in the book to be quite interesting; ‘’sincerity itself is bullshit’’ (67) since it confirms his plausibility of bullshitting. Although he supports that claim by some arguments (the impossibility of attaining self-knowledge unless we know other beings and the impossibility of the objectivity of reality that skepticism rises 64), this very statement can cancel out the whole attempt of clarifying bullshit. Frankfurt here knows that his book lacks something significant. Thus, he is trying to get away of that by claiming that authenticity is unattainable and unreachable which is the reason of him failing to represent it and considering it as bullshit accordingly ! Ironically, all the characteristics Frankfurt attributes to the concept of bullshit apply to the claims he makes throughout his book, especially in regards of its failure to fulfill its ‘purpose’. In fact, Frankfurt is bullshitting his readers by claiming to talk about bullshit while trying to get away of it. I do not know if Frankfurt was aware of the fact that he was embodying the concept of bullshit by writing this book! I do not think that Frankfurt really cared to clarify bullshit more than caring to pretend that he was attempting to do so!

Frankfurt uses Arthur Abdel Simpson’s quote from Eric’s Ambler’s Dirty Story to support his argument that it is easier to get away from bullshit more than lies (48). I will follow the same quote to advise Frankfurt; Never bullshit when you are talking about bullshit! Because if you usually can get away of bullshit, you cannot do it when you are talking about it!


Works cited


Frankfurt, Harry G. On Bullshit, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2005