Concerning Memory Theory of Personal Identity: Examining Real Memories vs. Apparent Memories

March 4th, 2010

Concerning Memory Theory of Personal Identity: Examining Real Memories vs. Apparent Memories 

What makes me? A question that dazzled philosophers and had never led them to consensus. John Perry in his Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality displayed four theories of personal identity; body theory, soul theory, memory theory and brain theory, each of which has its advantages and its problems. In this paper, I will discuss the memory theory, which I find the most plausible. I will display some advantages of the theory and some arguments against it. Finally, I will defend my theory and respond to some of the objections on it.

According to the memory theory, having sameness and continuity of memory over time is what makes one the same person. Bodily identity, sameness of soul and sameness of brain are not necessary for personal identity (Perry 42) . Person A is identical to person B only if they have the same chains of memory over time even if they happen to have different bodies, different souls or different brains. The theory is supported by the concept of ‘‘person-stages’’, which views a person as consisted of different ‘stretches’ of conscious experiences (Perry 25).What makes two person stages belong to the same person is the ability of the later person stages to remember the earlier person stages because of their connection over time through a chain of memory. The memory theory suggests the concept of ‘real memory’ as ‘apparent memory, caused in the right way’ (Perry 45).

Assuming the validity of the memory theory, we can see the advantages of that theory especially regarding the belief of human immortality. If one can be the person he was before his death in case he had the same memories, it follows that one can survive his bodily death and be the same person without requiring sameness of body. In fact, we do not need to examine our bodies to judge that we have the same memories we had in the past and will have in the future. Thus, our memories are not dependent on our bodies. Accordingly, the memory theory liberates personal identity of any dependence on bodily identity. As a result, it becomes easier for one to judge his own identity without needing to examine his body (Perry 44) . If one can remember what happened to him yesterday, and will be able to remember tomorrow what happened to him today, it makes him the same person. Moreover, the memory theory focuses on the psychological or the mental proprieties of people and considers those properties the ‘mark of their individuality’ among others (Perry 43). Therefore, those properties should be the crucial thing in determining what preserves one’s personal identity (Perry 44).

A problem that the memory theory faces in regards of judging sameness or continuity of memory that there is no way to prove it except through introspection. We cannot conclude Sameness of memory from sameness of psychological characteristics, because ‘Similarity, however exact, is not identity’ (Perry 6). When person A has similar psychological characteristics with person B (honesty, kindness, patience, rudeness, rebellion, etc.) it does not mean that person A can be person B. Thus, we cannot conclude sameness of self from sameness of memory until we find a way to prove sameness of memory.

Furthermore, the memory theory faces the same problem that the soul theory faces which is accessibility. Because we cannot access others’ memories and others cannot access ours’, it makes it impossible to examine the occurrence or the continuity of them over time. The very immaterial nature of memory; untouchable, unseen, unmeasured and unfelt makes it impossible to neither observe any possible change in it nor make any judgment about it. Thus, we cannot judge if we are experiencing real memories or only apparent ones. The inability or difficulty of distinguishing between real and apparent memories is the most controversial problem with the memory theory. To solve this problem, Perry suggests that real memory is memory that we can refer to its actual cause in the time we recall it. For example, when someone remembers having an accident and remembers himself not paying attention to the road before the occurrence of the accident, it makes it a real memory. Whereas when one remembers people telling him that he had an accident and he only can remember what people told him about what happened before or during the accident , this makes it a an apparent memory.

The problem with this kind of distinction that we do not have a way to make sure that we only seem to remember while we think that we are truly remembering. The human mind always finds ways to prove that its memory is simultaneously produced due to actual causality. For example, a 3 years old boy is told the story of his cousin beating him up. The boy, because of repeatedly hearing the story, remembers how his cousin did beat him and how painful it was, and makes up details that prove that he is actually remembering the incident not seeming to remember it. The memory of being beaten up is a real memory from the boy’s point of view because he believes he remembers its causality. The same memory is an apparent memory from the point of view of witnesses who saw the incident going on in a different way from the way the boy describes it. Accordingly, one specific memory can be both real and apparent from different perspectives according to that distinction.

Another source of difficulty for the memory theory faces is its criterion of distinguishing between real memory and apparent memory, which is causality. If causality requires making a judgment about the existence or the occurrence of something in the external world, it will be difficult to determine if our perception of its identity is what actually it is. Therefore, causality is not a reliable criterion for preserving the distinction between real memory and apparent memory unless we judge it from God’s perspective. A Relativist would argue that even God, as the ultimate objective eye that captures the real identity of the whole universe, could not alter our perception of incidents in the physical world because even if we had access to his objective judgment, His judgment itself would be a subject of our perception. Since people do perceive the same thing differently, it follows that nothing in the external world has a meaning or real identity in itself. In other words, nothing inherently means anything in itself. Our minds are designed to automatically add meanings and make up interpretations to incidents in the external world and consequently create its identity. In that sense, memory itself is a human production.

Considering the fact that we create our memories without actually referring to the incidents that cause them, our memories are neither apparent nor real. Most of our memories are formed by our emotions (e.g. sorrow, joy, hate, love, reverence, etc.) and strongly connected to them. When someone remembers or seems to remember an incident, he cannot separate that incident from the emotion was caused neither by it nor from the interpretation that he makes up about it. That makes one’s memories always real from his own point of view because according to him, he cannot seem to remember something that is closely related to his emotions. The remembrance of a memory is in itself a sufficient proof to one’s belief in the real existence of that memory. Humans do not refer to the external world regarding their interpretations and memories of it even if they pretend doing so. This assumption can help the memory theory because it does not make the theory require distinguishing between real memories and apparent memories. Moreover, in cases of ‘‘body transplant’’ the possibility of being deluded regarding one’s memories will not occur because what makes a deluded person deluded is the fact that he cannot know it (Perry 38) . Perhaps some think that Mary Frances Beaudine is the one who survived ‘deluded, thinking she was someone else’, Julia (Perry 40). However, since Mary cannot know that she is deluded in remembering being Julia (i.e. does have a real memory), this will make her the same person according to the memory theory, even if she has a different body or a different mind. The only case where the memory theory will fail in such a situation is if Mary somehow becomes aware of the fact that she is deluded in remembering being Julia.


Works Cited

Perry, John. A Dialogue On Personal Identity and Immortality . Indianapolis,Indiana : Hackett Publishing Company, 1978.